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Accueil du site > Séminaire Roy > 2013-2014

2013-2014

Sauf mention contraire

Localisation :

De septembre à décembre :
Maison des Sciences Économiques (MSE), 106 - 112 boulevard de l’Hôpital 75647 Paris cedex 13 | Accès

De janvier à mai :
École normale supérieure, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris | Accès

De juin à septembre :
Maison des Sciences Économiques (MSE), 106 - 112 boulevard de l’Hôpital 75647 Paris cedex 13 | Accès

Périodicité : tous les lundis

Horaire : 17h00-18h15

23 septembre 2013

Xavier Vives, IESE Business School
Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games
Texte intégral

16 septembre 2013

Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern
A Common Value Auction with bidder Solicitation

30 septembre 2013

Willemien Kets, Northwestern
Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play in Games with Incomplete Information Texte intégral

7 octobre 2013

Françoise Forges, U. Paris-Dauphine
Bayesian repeated games

16 décembre 2013

Johannes Horner, Yale
Optimal Design for Social Learning
Co-ateur : Yeon-Koo Che
Texte intégral

6 janvier 2014

Katrin Tinn, Imperial college
Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections

13 janvier 2014

Thomas Mariotti, Toulouse School of Economics
Researcher’s Dilemma Co-auteurs : Catherine Bobtcheff, Jérôme Bolte

27 janvier 2014

Piero Gottardi, EUI, Forence
Risk Sharing and Contagion in Networks
Co-auteur : Antonio Cabrales, Fernando Vega Redondo
Texte intégral

27 janvier2014

Piero Gottardi (EUI, Forence)
Risk Sharing and Contagion in Networks
with Antonio Cabrales and Fernando Vega Redondo

http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Gottardi/robustcontagion-150114.pdf

17 février 2014

Aislinn Bohren (U. Penn)
Spot Market Incentives : Optimal Contract Design with Unverifiable Output

24 mars 2014

Joel Sobel (UCSD)
Persuasive Arguments

31 mars 2014

Marie-Claire Villeval (Gate, Lyon)
Self Control and Intertemporal Choice : Evidence from Glucose and Depletion Interventions
avec Michael A. Kuhn et Peter Kuhn

12 mai 2014

Anandi Mani, Sharun Mukand & Daniel Sgroi
Explaining Attitudes towards Taxation

Abextract : Standard theory suggests that the rich would like to see lower tax rates, but also that individuals may have social preferences that are independent of their wealth which may in part govern attitudes towards taxation. More recently their have been two important contributions that may enable us to gain more insight into tax attitudes. First, theoretical work has discussed "self-serving biases" that enable individuals to distort their memories of events in ways that boost their utility. Second, empirical studies have found significant differences in tax attitudes which seem to correlate with attitudes towards the importance of luck in life. We merge these two ideas in a controlled laboratory experiment (involving in excess of 450 participants) that allows individuals to make money through effort and luck, and to select tax rates on the resulting earnings under different information treatments. We find strong evidence that (1) individuals care about the source of the wealth of those that are taxed ; (2) the source of wealth of the tax-setter also matters a great deal and (3) individuals are willing to bias their attitudes in ways that benefit their own self-image. We thereby provide empirical support for the importance of the source of wealth (of the tax-payer and tax-setter) and the role of self-serving biases in establishing how individuals form their tax attitudes.