Accueil du site > Séminaire Roy > 2013-2014
Sauf mention contraire
Localisation :
Périodicité : tous les lundis
Horaire : 17h00-18h15
Xavier Vives, IESE Business School
Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games
Texte intégral
Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern
A Common Value Auction with bidder Solicitation
Willemien Kets, Northwestern
Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play in Games with Incomplete Information
Texte intégral
Françoise Forges, U. Paris-Dauphine
Bayesian repeated games
Matthew Jackson
Massimo Morelli
Thomas Tröger
Colin Stewart, Toronto
Johannes Horner, Yale
Optimal Design for Social Learning
Co-ateur : Yeon-Koo Che
Texte intégral
Katrin Tinn, Imperial college
Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections
Thomas Mariotti, Toulouse School of Economics
Researcher’s Dilemma
Co-auteurs : Catherine Bobtcheff, Jérôme Bolte
Pierre-Olivier Weill, UCLA
TBA
Piero Gottardi, EUI, Forence
Risk Sharing and Contagion in Networks
Co-auteur : Antonio Cabrales, Fernando Vega Redondo
Texte intégral
Piero Gottardi (EUI, Forence)
Risk Sharing and Contagion in Networks
with Antonio Cabrales and Fernando Vega Redondo
http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Gottardi/robustcontagion-150114.pdf
Aislinn Bohren (U. Penn)
Spot Market Incentives : Optimal Contract Design with Unverifiable Output
Alfred Galichon (Sciences Po)
Joel Sobel (UCSD)
Persuasive Arguments
Marie-Claire Villeval (Gate, Lyon)
Self Control and Intertemporal Choice : Evidence from Glucose and Depletion Interventions
avec Michael A. Kuhn et Peter Kuhn
Anandi Mani, Sharun Mukand & Daniel Sgroi
Explaining Attitudes towards Taxation
Abextract : Standard theory suggests that the rich would like to see lower tax rates, but also that individuals may have social preferences that are independent of their wealth which may in part govern attitudes towards taxation. More recently their have been two important contributions that may enable us to gain more insight into tax attitudes. First, theoretical work has discussed "self-serving biases" that enable individuals to distort their memories of events in ways that boost their utility. Second, empirical studies have found significant differences in tax attitudes which seem to correlate with attitudes towards the importance of luck in life. We merge these two ideas in a controlled laboratory experiment (involving in excess of 450 participants) that allows individuals to make money through effort and luck, and to select tax rates on the resulting earnings under different information treatments. We find strong evidence that (1) individuals care about the source of the wealth of those that are taxed ; (2) the source of wealth of the tax-setter also matters a great deal and (3) individuals are willing to bias their attitudes in ways that benefit their own self-image. We thereby provide empirical support for the importance of the source of wealth (of the tax-payer and tax-setter) and the role of self-serving biases in establishing how individuals form their tax attitudes.
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