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Accueil du site > Intranet > 2012-2013 > 22 avril 2013

22 avril 2013

Amrita Dhillon, Warwick University
Status, Incentives and Corruption
Coauteur : Antonio Nicolo
Résumé : We re-examine the hypothesis that increasing compensation to public sector officials reduces corruption, defined as bribe-taking. We introduce heterogeneity among agents on the dimension of how much they are motivated by "status" or prestige of a profession vs. purely monetary compensation. We show that increasing wages in this setting may increase corruption under realistic conditions on parameters. Using "prestige" as a choice variable for policy may have reinforcing effects in reducing corruption : it reduces both bribe taking behavior as well as improves the selection of workers in the public sector. Media, on the other hand, by emphasizing the "bad news” about corruption may worsen corruption reducing the status of a profession. Finally, we show that in our setting the use of non-monetary bonus, like medals, may improve both the quality of the officials and their honesty.

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