Rent dissipation in repeated entry games
some new results

Jean-Pierre PONSSARD
Laboratoire d’Econométrie de l’Ecole Polytechnique
Paris France
ponssard@poly.polytechnique.fr
This draft November 2003

Abstract
Two player infinitely repeated entry games are revisited using a new Markov equilibrium concept. The idea is to have an incumbent face an entrant which may use hit and run strategies. Contrarily to most existing approaches, rent dissipation no longer necessarily holds. It will not when competition is tough in case of entry. Similarities and differences with previous approaches are analyzed. Several examples are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers : C73, D43, L12.

1 Introduction

This paper revisits the dynamics of potential competition in a natural monopoly context. In such situations an incumbent is repeatedly facing an entrant. The originality of the paper is to assume that the entrant uses hit and run strategies: if the incumbent makes a mistake the entrant comes in, makes some money and then leaves. This is modeled through appropriate Markov strategies.

Contrarily to most existing approaches, rent dissipation need not necessarily prevail. Rent dissipation, which means that the stage rent of the incumbent goes to zero when the discount factor goes to one, has almost the status of a folk theorem in industrial organization (see among others Farrell, 1986, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1987 and Wilson, 1992). In traditional economics, the intuitive idea behind rent dissipation is a rational expectation argument. In Maskin and Tirole (1988) and in Ponssard (1991) a proper game analysis confirms the
rational expectation intuition. In our approach rent dissipation depends on the monopoly rent relative to the cost of entry: when this ratio is high rent dissipation occurs and when it is low it does not. Consequently, the tougher the competition in case of entry the more likely rent dissipation fails to hold.

These results provide some formal grounds to the critics of contestability theory (Baumol et al., 1982). Contestability, originally designed for the airline industry and then applied to many sectors such as telecoms, emphasizes the length of commitment (i.e., the discount factor) as the major strategic entry barrier irrespective of the other structural characteristics. Some empirical economists have challenged this view (Shepherd, 1984). More generally, Sutton (p. 35, 1991) has argued and documented that “a very sharp fall in price suffices to deter entry and maintain a monopoly outcome”, this is very much in line with the theoretic results obtained in this paper.

In addition to rent dissipation, selection is also analyzed. Selection means that only the more efficient firm can remain a permanent incumbent (this notion was introduced in Gromb et al., 1997, in which finitely repeated asymmetric entry games were first analyzed). It is proved that selection will always hold if the asymmetry between the two firms is high enough. This has some bearing with the empirical results reported by Scherer (1992) and Gerovski (1995) in which it is shown that most entries occur after large innovations.

These results on rent dissipation and on selection may be conveniently summarized through a new and interesting taxonomy of situations. The situation may be qualified as:

- excess-competition: if an incumbent were to choose to deter entry forever, it would have to dissipate all of its profits;
- under-competition: a less efficient incumbent can deter entry forever and make stationary positive profits;
- selection: a less efficient incumbent is not able to deter entry forever and make stationary positive profits, but a more efficient incumbent may.

The adopted Markov equilibrium concept extends the one used by Maskin and Tirole (1988). The idea is to relax the stationarity assumptions which they impose on the strategies. It is motivated by the results obtained in Gromb, Ponsnard and Sevy (1997). There it was shown that when one firm is more efficient than the other, at equilibrium, the less efficient firm cannot remain a permanent incumbent in a long enough game. This suggests that the stationarity assumption is too strong and is the reason for the drawback of the MT approach pointed out in Lahmandi et al. (1996) namely, that the less efficient firm can remain a permanent incumbent and, moreover, that its stage rent is higher than what the more efficient firm would obtain were it the permanent incumbent. Yet, the GPS approach, when extrapolated to infinitely repeated games, has drawbacks of its own. The issue remained open.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the class of infinitely repeated entry games under study. Various solution concepts may be used to

---

3 To be later referred to as the MT approach. Originally designed for entry games, this approach has been extended to any extensive game (Maskin and Tirole, 2001).

4 To be later referred to as the GPS approach.
analyze these games. In section 3 the MT approach is recalled, the GPS approach to finitely repeated games is extended to infinitely repeated ones, and the new approach is defined. Similarities and differences among these approaches are emphasized. Section 4 studies the mathematical properties of the proposed solution concept: the given finite time horizon for incumbency of the hit and run firm is the key parameter. It is proved that when an equilibrium exists it is necessarily unique, that this firm would prefer to play in a game in which its given time as an incumbent is as long as possible but that when this given time exceeds some bound such an equilibrium may no longer exist. Whenever there is no such bound the situation is one of rent dissipation. A necessary and sufficient condition for such a bound to exist is obtained. In section 5, the taxonomy of situations illustrating cases of under or excess-competition is introduced, some general comparative static properties are derived and specific examples detailed. Section 6 concludes with open questions that should be studied to improve our understanding of the proposed solution concept.

2 The game $\Gamma_\infty$

Various game forms may be used to capture the idea of short run commitments in a natural monopoly context. For convenience, our model is very similar to the one introduced in GPS. Denote $\Gamma_\infty$ such an entry game. The results can be easily extended to the other game forms.

Denote the two firms player 1 and player 2. Let $i$ be anyone of the two players and $j \neq i$ be the other one.

The game $\Gamma_\infty$ is constructed from two one stage Stackelberg entry games, denoted $G(1)$ and $G(2)$. The game $\Gamma_\infty$ consists of a sequence of such one stage games ($G(i^1), G(i^2), ..., G(i^k), ...$) in which any $i^k$ may be either 1 or 2 depending on the actual moves selected along the way.

Each game $G(i)$ is played as follows:

step 1: the first player to move is player $i$, it is called the incumbent, player $i$ may either select a move $x_i$ in $\mathbb{R}$ or move out;

step 2a: if player $i$ selects $x_i$ at step 1 then player $j$ may either select in (with respective payoffs for $i$ and $j$: $d_i(x_i), -C_j(x_i)$) or out (with respective payoffs: $v_i(x_i), 0$);

step 2b: if player $i$ selects out at step 1 then player $j$ may either select a move $x_j$ in $\mathbb{R}$ or move out;

step 3: if player $i$ selects out at step 1 and player $j$ selects $x_j$ at step 2b then player $i$ may either select in (with respective payoffs: $-C_i(x_j), d_j(x_j)$) or out (with respective payoffs: $0, v_j(x_j)$);

step 4: if player $i$ selects out at step 1 and player $j$ selects out at step 2b then the game $\Gamma_\infty$ stops (with respective payoffs: $0, 0$).

Moreover the actual play of $G(i)$ determines the incumbent in the next $G(i')$ to be played:

- player $i'$ is again player $i$ if this sequence is $(x_i, out)$ or $(out, x_j, in)$;
- player $i'$ is player $j$ if the sequence is $(x_i, in)$ or $(out, x_j, out)$.
The payoffs in $\Gamma_{\infty}$ are the discounted sum of the stage payoffs (with attention on discount factors close to 1).

This completely specifies $\Gamma_{\infty}$.

The functions $v_i, C_i, d_i$ may be interpreted as stage monopoly profits, entry costs and exit payoffs respectively. For $i \in (1, 2)$ it is assumed that $v_i$ is strictly increasing, $C_i$ strictly decreasing and $d_i$ non positive.

For $\Gamma_{\infty}$ to be of economic interest it is assumed that:

$$C^{-1}_{j}(0) > v^{-1}_{i}(0)$$

The first inequality means that the static “limit price” of player $i$, $C^{-1}_{j}(0)$, should be higher than player $i$’s “average cost”, $v^{-1}_{i}(0)$, otherwise player $i$ is definitely barred from entry (the situation is one of "bockaded entry"). Similarly for player $j$.

For mathematical convenience it will be further assumed that the functions $v_i$ and $C_i$ have derivatives and that these derivatives are uniformly bounded away from zero and from infinity. It is believed that this technical assumption may be relaxed without affecting the results.

Two classes of games shall be of special interest.

The class of symmetric entry games in which $v_1 = v_2$ and $C_1 = C_2$. The economic issue is rent dissipation: at equilibrium, does the stage payoff of the incumbent $v_i(x_i)$ converges to zero when the discount factor goes to one ?

The class of asymmetric entry games in which $v_1 = v_2 + \Delta f$ in which $\Delta f$ is a constant, and $C_1 = C_2$. The economic issue is selection: suppose $i^i = 2$, then is it true that for all $\Delta f > 0$, at equilibrium, player 1 is the long run incumbent i.e., for all $k \geq k^*$, $i^k = 1$, whatever the discount rate close enough to one ?

3 Markov equilibrium concepts

This section compares three refinements of Markov equilibrium. In all these refinements, the state variable may depend on time but not on the past moves played by the players. Varying the way the state variable depends on time, one defines the MT approach, the GPS extension to infinitely repeated games, and the new approach proposed in this paper.

Let

- $\tau$ be the time sequence with $\tau \in \{1, 2 \ldots \infty\}$;
- $\theta$ be the state variable, $\theta = (i, \tau)$ which means that $\Gamma_{\infty}$ is at time $\tau$ and that the players are currently playing game $G(i)$;
- $(z^\theta_1, z^\theta_2)$ stand for the decisions in $G(i)$ given $\theta$ and $(Z_1, Z_2)$ stand for the strategies;
• $G_1^0(z_1^0, z_2^0)$ and $G_2^0(z_1^0, z_2^0)$ stand for the respective stage payoffs in $G(i)$ given $\theta$ and $(z_1^0, z_2^0)$;

• $\theta^*(z_1^0, z_2^0) = (i^+, \tau + 1)$ be the next stage state variable given $\theta$ and $(z_1^0, z_2^0)$ where $i^+$ is defined according to the rules of $\Gamma_\infty$;

• $\delta$ be the discount rate;

• $(Y_1, Y_2)$ be a Markov equilibrium when it exists;

• $\pi_1(Y_1, Y_2 | \theta)$ and $\pi_2(Y_1, Y_2 | \theta)$ refer to the players discounted equilibrium payoffs given an initial state $\theta$ and an equilibrium $(Y_1, Y_2)$.

**Definition 1** Markov equilibria\(^5\) are such that:

\[
\pi_1(Y_1, Y_2 | \theta) = \max_{z_1^0} \left[ G_1^0(z_1^0, y_2^0) + \delta \pi_1 (Y_1, Y_2 | \theta^*(z_1^0, y_2^0)) \right] \\
\pi_2(Y_1, Y_2 | \theta) = \max_{z_2^0} \left[ G_2^0(y_1^0, z_2^0) + \delta \pi_2 (Y_1, Y_2 | \theta^*(y_1^0, z_2^0)) \right]
\]

The first refinement to be considered consists in assuming that $\theta$ does not depend on $\tau$; then the strategies of the players depend only on who is the current incumbent. Provided that $\delta$ is sufficiently close to one, the following proposition holds (Maskin and Tirole, 1988)\(^6\):

**Proposition 2** Let $y_1$ and $y_2$ be the solution, proved to exist and to be unique, of the following system of two equations:\(^7\)

for all $i \neq j \in \{1, 2\}$$-C_i(y_j) + \delta v_i(y_i)/(1 - \delta) = 0$

then the following moves in $G(i)$ generate a Markov equilibrium :

player $i$ plays $x_i = y_i$
player $j$ plays out if and only if $x_i \leq y_i$.

This Markov equilibrium satisfies rent dissipation ($\lim_{k \to -1} v_i(y_i) = 0$) but not selection (suppose $i^1 = 2$, for all $k$ and all $\delta$ close to one we have $i^k = 2$).

A second refinement of Markov equilibria is obtained as a direct extension of GPS for finite games. Denote $\Gamma_k$ a finite entry game where $k$ here refers to the maximal number of times the stage games $G(i)$ may be repeated. The notation $\Gamma_k(1)$ and $\Gamma_k(2)$ makes precise who is the initial incumbent in $\Gamma_k$. Observe that any such game $\Gamma_k(i^1)$ is a finite perfect information game so that it has a unique perfect equilibrium. Provided that $\delta$ is sufficiently close to one, the following proposition holds for the case of asymmetric games (Gromb et al., 1997).

\(^5\)This system of equations is known as the Shapley recursive equations for recursive games (Shapley, 1953)

\(^6\)Maskin and Tirole’s analysis is carried out on a specific Cournot model but their Markov approach can be directly applied to the class of entry games defined in this paper. While they identify other Markov equilibria, the focus in their paper is on the one characterized by proposition 2.

\(^7\)In the following three propositions, we should more precisely write $y_i(\delta)$, the dependency of $y_i$ on the discount factor $\delta$ is left out to simplify the notations.
Proposition 3 For all $\Delta f > 0$ (i.e. player 1 is more efficient than player 2) let an integer $N$ and two sequences $y_1^f$ and $y_2^f$ for $\tau \in \{0, 1, 2...N\}$ be the solution, proved to exist and be unique, of the following system of equations:

for all $i \neq j \in \{1, 2\}$

$$-C_i(y_j^f) = 0$$

$$-C_i(y_j^f) + \sum_{\tau' = \tau+1}^{\tau' = N} \delta^{\tau' - \tau} v_i(y_i^{\tau'}) = 0$$

for $\tau \in \{0, 1, 2...N - 1\}$

and

$$\sum_{\tau' = \tau}^{\tau' = N} \delta^{\tau' - \tau} v_i(y_i^{\tau'}) \geq 0$$

for $\tau \in \{1, 2...N\}$

but

$$\sum_{\tau = 0}^{\tau = N} \delta^\tau v_i(y_i^\tau) < 0.$$  

Then the unique perfect equilibrium in $\Gamma_k(2)$ is such that:  

for $k \leq N$ player $i$ plays $x_i = y_i^{N-k+1}$ and player $j$ plays out if and only if $x_i \leq y_i^{N-k+1}$;  

but for $k = N+1$ player 2 plays out, then player 1 plays $x_1 = y_1^0$ and player 2 plays out if and only if $x_1 \leq y_1^0$.

This proposition allows to construct the equilibrium of any game $\Gamma_k(i^1)$ whatever its length $k > N + 1$ using a backward induction argument. Indeed, since the initial equilibrium move for player 2 in $\Gamma_{N+1}(2)$ is out then in terms of payoffs, we have $\Gamma_{N+1}(2) \equiv \Gamma_{N+1}(1)$ with a zero equilibrium payoff for player 2, so that, $\Gamma_{N+2}(2) \equiv \Gamma_1(2)$ while $\Gamma_{N+2}(1) \equiv \Gamma_1(1) + \Gamma_{N+1}(1)$. Let $k = (N+1)q + r$ with $r < N + 1$, then $\Gamma_k(i^1)$ will be played as a game $\Gamma_1(i^1)$ followed by $q$ times $\Gamma_{N+1}(1)$ games. Since $\Gamma_k(i^1)$ is a perfect information game the unique equilibrium moves at a given stage do not depend on the past moves.

This implies that selection is satisfied in $\Gamma_k(2)$ provided that $k$ is large enough. Rent dissipation is also satisfied since it can be shown that $\lim_{\Delta f \to 0} N(\Delta f) = \infty$ and that $\lim_{\Delta f \to 0} v_i(y_i^f(\Delta f)) = 0$.

It is possible to extend the equilibrium in $\Gamma_k(i^1)$ into a Markov equilibrium in $\Gamma_\infty(i^1)$. The direct way to proceed consists in assuming that the state variable $\theta$ depends on $\tau \mod N + 1$. Let $\tau = \tau \mod N + 1$. At $\tau$ the players will play $\Gamma_{N+1-r}$. If $\tau = 0$, player 2’s first move is to move out.

This refinement of Markov equilibria satisfies both rent dissipation and selection but is not appealing. Why would the two players “agree” on the sequencing of $\Gamma_\infty(i)$ into finite games, the length of which should precisely be $N + 1$? After many stages why should the origin of the game still matter? This is certainly not what economists mean by non collusion in an infinite horizon.

The third Markov equilibrium refinement to be further considered is constructed along the following ideas.  

Take as a working assumption that one of the players cannot remain as an incumbent indefinitely. Call $S$ this player (for short term player) and denote $L$ the other one (for long term player). Denote by $n$ the number of stages that $S$ may stay as an incumbent. Four conditions come to mind.

---

6 For simplicity only the equilibrium path is described, the best response after non equilibrium moves is easily completed.

7 These ideas go back to Louvert, 1998.
**Condition 1** (*backward induction*): as long as S’s moves are reasonable, L should be patient enough to wait until S moves out;

**Condition 2** (*recursivity*): L should permanently deter S from moving in i.e., the entry cost generated by L’s move as an incumbent should be equal to the total rent S can get through his one shot hit and run strategy;

**Condition 3** (*self-enforceability*): at the end of his stay S should indeed find that his best interest is to move out;

**Condition 4** (*optimality of the duration n of the hit and run strategy*): n should be selected to S’s best interest so as to maximize the total rent of his one shot strategy.

It is believed that these conditions capture well the underlying ideas of the hit and run strategy as described in Baumol et al. (1982). The only difference we can think of is that in our approach L is not constrained to stand still while S gets his profit, but it is in his best interest to do so. Our approach should gain more acceptance among economists.

These ideas are now formalized. It will be convenient to keep condition (4) aside and define our Markov solution concept for any exogenously given n, then look for the best n from S’s point of view.

The new state variable and the associated transition rules are now defined. Let

- t be a relative time variable with \( t \in \{0, 1, 2...n\} \);
- \( \theta' \) be the new state variable, the possible values of which are \( \theta' = L \) or \( \theta' = (S, t) \) with \( t \in \{0, 1, 2...n\} \); \( \theta' \) specifies the incumbent in the current stage game \( G(i) \) and the relative time variable \( t \) if this incumbent is \( S \);
- again, \((z_{1}^{\theta'}, z_{2}^{\theta'})\) stand for the decisions in \( G(i) \) given \( \theta' \) and \((Z_{1}, Z_{2})\) stand for the strategies, and \( G_{1}^{\theta'}(z_{1}^{\theta'}, z_{2}^{\theta'}) \) and \( G_{2}^{\theta'}(z_{1}^{\theta'}, z_{2}^{\theta'}) \) stand for the respective stage payoffs in \( G(i) \) given \( \theta' \) and \((z_{1}^{\theta'}, z_{2}^{\theta'})\);
- \( i^+ \) be the next stage incumbent given \( \theta' \), \((z_{1}^{\theta'}, z_{2}^{\theta'})\) and the rules of \( \Gamma_{\infty} \);
- the transition rules to get \( \theta'^{+} \), the next stage state variable given \( \theta' \) and \( i^+ \), be such that:
  - if \( \theta' = L \) and \( i^+ = L \) then \( \theta'^{+} = L \)
  - if \( \theta' = L \) and \( i^+ = S \) then \( \theta'^{+} = (S, 1) \)
  - if \( \theta' = (S, t) \) and \( i^+ = L \) then \( \theta'^{+} = L \)
  - if \( \theta' = (S, t) \) and \( i^+ = S \) then \( \theta'^{+} = (S, t + 1 \mod n + 1) \).

This definition of the state variable is such that when \( L \) is the (unchallenged) incumbent tomorrow is like today but, when \( S \) is, both players know that \( S \)’s incumbency time will eventually come to an end.

For a given value of the parameter \( n \), the following proposition gives sufficient conditions to obtain such a Markov equilibrium in \( \Gamma_{\infty} \). Existence and uniqueness will be addressed later. In the remaining part of this paper, when it exists, such an equilibrium will be denoted a SME of \( \Gamma_{\infty} \) (for selected Markov equilibrium).
Proposition 4 Let \( y_L \) and \( y_S^t \) for \( t \in \{0,1,2...n \} \) be a solution (if it exists) of the following system of equations:

\[
-C_L(y_S^t) + v_L(y_L) \delta (1 - \delta^{n-t})/(1 - \delta) = 0 \quad \text{for} \ t \in \{0,1,2...n \}
\]

\[
-C_S(y_L) + \Sigma_{t=1}^{n} \delta^t v_S(y_S^t) = 0
\]

and

\[
v_L(y_L) \geq 0
\]

\[
\Sigma_{t=1}^{n} \delta^t v_S(y_S^t) \geq 0 \quad \text{for} \ t \in \{1,2...n \}
\]

but

\[
\Sigma_{t=1}^{n} \delta^t v_S(y_S^t) < 0
\]

Then the following moves in \( \Gamma_\infty \) are a Markov equilibrium:

- if \( \theta^t = L \) player \( L \) plays \( x_L = y_L \) and player \( S \) plays \( \text{out} \) iff \( x_L \leq y_L \)

(in case player \( L \) moves out then player \( S \) also moves out\(^{10}\));

- if \( \theta^t = (S,0) \) player \( S \) plays \( \text{out} \) then player \( L \) plays \( x_L = y_L \) and player \( S \) plays \( \text{out} \) iff \( x_S \leq y_S^t \)

(in case player \( S \) plays \( x_S \) player \( L \) moves out iff \( x_S \leq y_S^t \));

- if \( \theta^t = (S,t) \) with \( t \neq 0 \) player \( S \) plays \( x_S = y_S^t \) and player \( L \) plays \( \text{out} \) iff \( x_L \leq y_L \)

(in case player \( S \) plays \( \text{out} \) then player \( L \) plays \( x_L = y_L \) and player \( S \) plays \( \text{out} \) iff \( x_L \leq y_L \)).

Proof. Let \( (Z_L, Z_S) \) be the Markov strategies as defined in the proposition. The associated equilibrium paths are as follows:

- if \( \theta^t = L \) the path is : \((y_L, \text{out}), (y_L, \text{out}), ...)\);
- if \( \theta^t = (S,0) \) the path is : \((\text{out}, y_L, \text{out}), (y_L, \text{out}), ...)\);
- if \( \theta^t = (S,t) \) with \( t \neq 0 \) the path is : \((y_S^t, \text{out}), (y_S^{t+1}, \text{out}), ..., (y_S^n, \text{out}), (\text{out}, y_L, \text{out}), (\text{out}, y_L, \text{out}), ...)\).

The corresponding non negative discounted payoffs are easily computed as follows:

\[
\pi_L(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = L) = \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = (S,0)) = v_L(y_L)/(1 - \delta)
\]

\[
\pi_L(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = (S,t)) = \delta^{t+1} \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = L)
\]

\[
v_L(y_L) \delta^{n+1-t} / (1 - \delta) \quad \text{for} \ t \in \{1,2...n \}
\]

\[
\pi_S(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = (S,t)) = \Sigma_{\tau=t}^{n} \delta^{\tau-t} v_S(y_S^\tau) \quad \text{for} \ t \in \{1,2...n \}
\]

\[
\pi_S(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = (S,0)) = \pi_S(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = L) = 0
\]

Part 1: \( Z_L \) is a best response to \( Z_S \).

Let \( \theta^t = L \)

- if player \( L \) selects \( x_L \leq y_L \) player \( S \) moves \( \text{out} \) so that \( \theta^{t+} = L \), then player \( L \) discounted payoff is \( v_L(x_L) + \delta \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = L) \)

which is maximized at \( x_L = y_L \) to be \( \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = L) \);

- if player \( L \) selects \( x_L > y_L \) player \( S \) moves \( \text{out} \) so that \( \theta^{t+1} = (S,1) \), then player \( L \) discounted payoff is \( d_L(x_L) + \delta \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = (S,1)) = d_L(x_L) + \delta^{n+1} \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = L) < \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S | \theta^t = L) \) since \( d_L(x_L) \leq 0 \) and \( \delta < 1 \);

- if player \( L \) moves \( \text{out} \) player \( S \) also moves \( \text{out} \) and the game ends with zero payoff for player \( L \).

\(^{10}\)To have a perfect Markov equilibrium, it may be necessary to let player \( S \) have a "free ride" if player \( L \) makes the mistake of moving \( \text{out} \). This detail is left out for simplicity.
- this shows that \( x_L = y_L \) is a best response.

Let \( \theta' = (S,t) \) for \( t \in \{0,1,2,\ldots n\} \)
- if player \( S \) selects \( x_S \leq y_S^t \) then by moving \emph{out} player \( L \) gets \( \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = (S,t)) = \delta^{n+1-t} \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = L) \) while by moving \emph{in} he gets \(-C_L(x_S) + \delta \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = L) \)
- consequently \( -C_L(x_S) \leq -C_L(y_S^t) \) we have :
- \(-C_L(x_S) + \delta \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = L) \leq -C_L(y_S^t) + \delta \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = L) \)
- by construction \(-C_L(y_S^t) = -\sum_{t=1}^{n} \delta^t v_S(y_S^t) \) while \( \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = L) = \delta v_L(y_L)/(1 - \delta) \) so that
- \(-C_L(y_S^t) + \delta \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = L) = \delta^{n+1-t} \pi_L(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = L) \)
- hence player \( L \) is indifferent and to move \emph{out} is a best response;
- if player \( S \) select \( x_S > y_S^t \) the same argument but with \(-C_L(x_S) > -C_L(y_S^t) \) shows that player \( L \) best response is to move \emph{in};
- if player \( S \) moves \emph{out} then, using the argument given for \( \theta' = L \) it is clear that player \( L \) should play \( x_L = y_L \).

Part II : \( Z_S \) is a best response to \( Z_L \).

Let \( \theta' = L \)
- if player \( L \) selects \( x_L \leq y_L \) by moving \emph{out} player \( S \) gets \( \pi_S(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = L) = 0 \), while if he moves \emph{in} he gets \(-C_S(x_L) + \delta \pi_S(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = (S,1)) \).
- since \(-C_S(x_L) \leq -C_S(y_L) \) we have
- \(-C_S(x_L) + \delta \pi_S(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = (S,1)) \leq -C_S(y_L) + \delta \pi_S(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = (S,1)) \)
- by construction \(-C_S(y_L) = -\sum_{t=1}^{n} \delta^t v_S(y_S^t) \) while \( \pi_S(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = (S,1)) = \sum_{t'=1}^{n} \delta^{t-1} v_S(y_S^{t'}) \)
- so that
- \(-C_S(y_L) + \delta \pi_S(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = (S,1)) = 0 \)
- hence player \( S \) is indifferent and to move \emph{out} is a best response;
- if player \( L \) select \( x_L > y_L \) the same argument but with \(-C_S(x_L) > -C_S(y_L) \) shows that player \( S \) best response is to move \emph{in};
- if player \( L \) selects \emph{out} and player \( S \) moves \emph{out} the game ends and player \( S \) gets 0, while if he selects \( y_S^t \leq x_S \), by the Markov assumption player \( L \) moves \emph{in} and player \( S \) discounted payoff is \( d_S(x_S) + 0 \leq 0 \), finally if player \( S \) selects \( x_S < y_S^t \) player \( L \) will move \emph{out} but in that case player \( S \) discounted payoff is strictly negative since \( \sum_{t'=1}^{n} \delta^{t-1} v_S(y_S^{t'}) < 0 \), player \( S \) best response is to move \emph{out}.

Let \( \theta' = (S,t) \) for \( t \in \{0,1,2,\ldots n\} \)
- if player \( S \) selects moving \emph{out} or \( x_S > y_S^t \) (in which case player \( L \) moves \emph{in}) he gets 0;
- if player \( S \) selects \( x_S \leq y_S^t \) player \( L \) plays \emph{out} and player \( S \) discounted payoff is \( v_S(x_S) + \delta \pi_S(Z_L, Z_S \mid \theta' = (S,t + 1 \ \text{modulo} \ n + 1)) \)
  which is maximized at \( x_S = y_S^t \) to be \( \sum_{t'=t}^{n} \delta^{t'-t} v_S(y_S^{t'}) \); by construction this expression is non negative if \( t \) is different from 0, and non positive if \( t = 0 \), consequently player \( S \) best response is \( x_S = y_S^t \) for \( t \in \{1,2,\ldots n\} \) but \emph{out} for \( t = 0 \).

In such an equilibrium player \( L \) is the only permanent incumbent and plays \( x_L = y_L \). If he makes the mistake of playing \( x_L > y_L \), then player \( S \) moves \emph{in},
gets some money and moves out after $n$ stages. Player $L$ is patient enough to wait until player $S$ moves out and it is player $S$’s best interest to move out after $n$ stages of incumbency.

4 Properties of SME’s for a given $n$

This section addresses the mathematical properties of SME’s for a given $n$. Some preliminary comments are in order.

Our attention is focused on the case $\delta$ close to 1. It will be proved that if the system of equations given in Proposition 4 has a solution it is necessarily unique. For mathematical simplicity, the proof is made on the limit system when $\delta$ goes to 1. The same arguments would apply to the system when $\delta$ is close to 1. Then, because this system is continuous in $\delta$ its unique solution when $\delta$ goes to 1 converges to the unique solution of the limit system. It is the properties of this solution which we study further.

The limit system is easily derived, it is denoted $\Sigma_1$.

**Lemma 5** When $\delta$ goes to 1 the limit system $\Sigma_1$ of the system defined in Proposition 4 is such that:

- for $t \in \{0, 1, 2...n\}$
  - $-C_L(y_S^t) + (n - t)v_L(y_L) = 0$ (1)
  - $-C_S(y_L) + \sum_{t=1}^{n} v_S(y_S^t) = 0$ (2)

and

- $v_L(y_L) \geq 0$ (3)
- $\Sigma_{t'=t}^{n} v_S(y_S^{t'}) \geq 0$ (4)

but

- $\Sigma_{t'=0}^{n} v_S(y_S^{t'}) < 0$ (5)

Some further notation is now introduced. Recall that $n$ is a parameter that specifies how long player $S$ may stay as an incumbent. To avoid ambiguity it may be useful to index by $n$ the game as $\Gamma_n$ and a SME in $\Gamma_n$ as $y_L(n)$ and $y_S(n)$ for $t \in \{0, 1, 2...n\}$. In $\Gamma_n$, the stage rent for player $L$ refers to $v_L(y_L(n))$ and the total rent for player $S$ refers to $\Sigma_{t'=1}^{n} v_S(y_S^{t'}(n))$.

We will prove that if there exist respective SME’s for some $n$ and some $m$ with $m > n$ then player $S$ total rent is higher in $\Gamma_m$ than in $\Gamma_n$. A necessary and sufficient condition will be provided for the existence of a SME in $\Gamma_n$ for arbitrarily large values of $n$. It will be shown that this existence implies that the stage rent of player $L$ goes to zero as $n$ goes to infinity.

**Theorem 6**: $\Gamma_n$ admits at most one SME for large enough $n$.  

10
Proof. The proof goes as follows. Firstly prove that conditions (1-2-3-4) of $\Sigma_1$ have a unique solution. Secondly, check whether condition (5) is satisfied: if it is, the unique solution of $\Sigma_1$ is obtained, if it is not $\Sigma_1$ has no solution.

To prove the first part, for all $x_L \in (v_{L}^{-1}(0), C_{S}^{-1}(0))$, define the function $W(x_L) = C_{S}(x_L) - \Sigma_{1}^{n} v_{S}(x_{S}^{t})$ in which the sequence $(x_{S}^{t})$ is derived from $x_L$ through (1) that is,

$$-C_{L}(x_{S}^{t}) + (n - t)v_{L}(x_{L}) = 0 \quad \text{for } t \in \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, n\}$$

then, show that $W(x_L)$ is negative (step 1) then positive (step 2) and that its derivative termwise is strictly positive (step 3) so that there is a unique solution to the equation $W(x_L) = 0$. Indeed:

Step 1: if $x_L = v_{L}^{-1}(0)$ then $W(x_L) < 0$

In that case $x_{S}^{t} = C_{L}^{-1}(0)$ for all $t$ so that $W(v_{L}^{-1}(0)) = C_{S}(v_{L}^{-1}(0)) - n v_{S}(C_{L}^{-1}(0))$

and by assumption $v_{S}(C_{L}^{-1}(0)) > 0$ so that for $n$ large enough $W(v_{L}^{-1}(0)) < 0$.

Step 2: if $x_L = C_{S}^{-1}(0)$ then $W(x_L) > 0$

Since $C_{L}$ is strictly decreasing, the sequence $(x_{S}^{t})$ is a strictly increasing sequence bounded by $C_{L}^{-1}(0)$. Since $v_{S}$ is strictly increasing this implies that $\Sigma_{1}^{n} v_{S}(x_{S}^{t})$ is certainly negative for $n$ large enough so that $W(C_{S}^{-1}(0)) = -\Sigma_{1}^{n} v_{S}(x_{S}^{t})$ is certainly positive.

Step 3: $\frac{dW}{dx_{L}} > 0$

We have

$$\frac{dW}{dx_{L}} = \frac{dC_{S}}{dx_{L}} - \Sigma_{t=1}^{n} \frac{dv_{S}}{dx_{S}} \frac{dx_{S}^{t}}{dx_{L}}$$

Using (1) we get:

$$\frac{dx_{S}^{t}}{dx_{L}} = (n - t) \frac{dv_{L}}{dx_{L}} \frac{dC_{L}}{dx_{S}^{t}}$$

By substitution it follows that:

$$\frac{dW}{dx_{L}} = \frac{dC_{S}}{dx_{L}} - \frac{dv_{L} S_{t=1}^{n} (n - t) dv_{S}}{dx_{S}^{t}} \frac{dC_{L}}{dx_{S}^{t}}$$

By assumption $\frac{dv_{S}}{dx_{S}^{t}} \frac{dC_{L}}{dx_{S}^{t}}$ is uniformly bounded away from zero by $\varepsilon$ so that

$$\frac{dW}{dx_{L}} \geq \frac{dC_{S}}{dx_{L}} + \frac{dv_{L} \, n(n - 1)}{2} \varepsilon$$

I am indebted to Rida Laraki for providing the argument for this proof.
Since \( \frac{dv_L}{dx_L} \) is bounded away from zero and since \( \frac{dC_S}{dx_L} \) is bounded away from \( -\infty \) we certainly have \( \frac{dW}{dx_L} > 0 \) for \( n \) large enough.

Hence for a given \( n \) large enough there is a unique solution to \( W(x_L) = 0 \) that is to (2). This solution is in \( [v^{-1}_L(0), C^{-1}_S(0)] \) so that (3) is also satisfied. Denote \( \hat{y}_L \) this solution and \( (\hat{y}^t_S) \) for \( t \in \{0,1,2,...n\} \) the associated sequence obtained through (1). Observe that (4) is satisfied as well: since \( v_S \) is increasing the function \( \Sigma_{t=0}^n v_S(\hat{y}^t_S) \) is bell shaped with respect to \( t \) so for all \( t \) we have:

\[
\Sigma_{t=0}^n v_S(\hat{y}^t_S) \geq \min(\Sigma_{t=0}^n v_S(\bar{y}^t_S), v_S(\bar{y}^t_S)) = \min(C_S(\hat{y}_L), v(C^{-1}_S(0))) > 0
\]

because \( \hat{y}_L < C^{-1}_S(0) \) implies \( C_S(\hat{y}_L) > 0 \) while \( \bar{y}^n_S = v(C^{-1}_S(0)) > 0 \) by construction.

It is now a simple matter to check whether (5) holds or not. If it does a complete solution to \( \Sigma_1 \) is obtained, if it does not there cannot be a solution for that value of \( n \) since conditions (1) through (4) have a unique solution.

**Theorem 7** If there exists a SME respectively in \( \Gamma^m_{\infty} \) and in \( \Gamma^n_{\infty} \) with \( m > n \) then \( y_L(m) \leq y_L(n) \) so that player \( S \) total rent is higher in \( \Gamma^m_{\infty} \) than in \( \Gamma^n_{\infty} \).

**Proof.** Suppose \( y_L(m) > y_L(n) \) then \( v_L(y_L(m)) > v_L(y_L(n)) \). Since \( C_L \) is strictly decreasing this implies for all \( t \in \{0,1,2,...n\} \):

\[
\hat{y}^n_S - t(m) < y^t_S - n(m)
\]

so that

\[
\Sigma_{t=0}^n v_S(\hat{y}^n_S - t(m)) < \Sigma_{t=0}^n v_S(y^t_S - n(m))
\]

For \( t \in \{n+1,..m\} \) we still have \( \hat{y}^n_S - t(m) < y^0_S(n,m) \) and, because of (5) we also certainly have \( v_S(\hat{y}^n_S(n,m)) < 0 \) then

\[
\Sigma_{t=m-1}^n v_S(\hat{y}^n_S - t(m)) \leq \Sigma_{t=m-1}^n v_S(y^t_S - n(m))
\]

Then

\[
\Sigma_{t=m-1}^n v_S(\hat{y}^n_S - t(m)) < \Sigma_{t=m-1}^n v_S(y^t_S - n(m))
\]

By construction the left hand side should be greater or equal to zero while the right hand side should be strictly negative thus a contradiction. □

**Theorem 8** Suppose there is a SME in \( \Gamma^n_{\infty} \) for all values of \( n \) then:

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} v_L(y_L(n)) = 0
\]

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \Sigma_{t=0}^n v_S(\hat{y}^t_S(n)) = C_S(v^{-1}_L(0))
\]
\[ \lim_{n \to \infty} y_S^1(n) = x^* \]

in which \( x^* \) is uniquely defined as:

\[ \int_{x^*}^{C_L^{-1}(0)} v_S(x) \frac{dC_L}{dx}(x)dx = 0 \]

**Proof.** Parts 1 and 2 of the theorem are easily proved.

Indeed, suppose \( v_L(y_L(n)) \geq \varepsilon > 0 \) for all \( n \), then using (1) the sequence \( (y_S^1(n)) \) is a strictly increasing sequence defined backwards from \( y_S^1(n) = C_L^{-1}(0) \), so (4) cannot hold for large \( n \) hence \( \lim_{n \to \infty} v_L(y_L(n)) = 0 \). Then Part 2 follows from (2).

Part 3.

First of all, given that \( \frac{dC_L}{dx} \) is bounded away from infinity and from zero and that \( v_S(x) \) is bounded away from zero, there exists a unique \( x^* < C_L^{-1}(0) \) such that

\[ \int_{x^*}^{C_L^{-1}(0)} v_S(x) \frac{dC_L}{dx}(x)dx = 0 \]

For all \( x \leq C_L^{-1}(0) \) define \( F(x) = \int_x^{C_L^{-1}(0)} v_S(u) \frac{dC_L}{dx}(u)du \), the function \( F \) is such that \( F(x) > 0 \) if \( x < x^* \).

We now show the convergence of \( y_S^1(n) \) to \( x^* \).

Using (1) and (2) we get:

\[ C_S(y_L(n))v_L(y_L(n)) = \sum_{t=1}^{n} v_S(y_S^1(n))v_L(y_L(n)) \]

\[ = \sum_{t=1}^{n} v_S(y_S^1(n)) [C_L(y_S^{1}(n)) - C_L(y_S^1(n))] \]

When \( v_L(y_L(n)) \) is small this non negative expression is close to \( F(y_S^1(n)) \).\(^{12}\)

This proves that \( y_S^1(n) \) cannot be far below \( x^* \). Using (2) and (5) for the two sequences \( n \) and \( n+1 \), it is clear that \( y_S^1(n+1) \) and \( y_S^1(n) \) cannot be far apart either. More precisely:

\[ |y_S^1(n+1) - y_S^1(n)| \leq -M in \left( \frac{dC_L}{dx}(y_S^1(n)), \frac{dC_L}{dx}(y_S^0(n)) \right)v_L(y_L(n)) \]

Since \( \frac{dC_L}{dx} \) is bounded away from infinity, \( \lim_{n \to \infty} |y_S^1(n+1) - y_S^1(n)| = 0 \), this is enough to prove that \( y_S^1(n) \) converges to some limit and this limit can only

\(^{12}\)Proof. Make the change of variable from \( x_S \) to \( u = C_L(x_S) \). As \( t \) goes from 1 to \( n \), \( x_S \) increases from \( y_L^1(n) \) to \( y_S^0(n) \) and \( u \) from \( u^1(n) = C_L(y_L^1(n)) \) to \( u^0(n) = C_L(y_S^0(n)) = 0 \). but \( u^{-1}(n) - u^1(n) \) remains \( t \) independant and equals \( v_L(y_L(n)) \), let \( \Delta u(n) = v_L(y_L(n)) \).

We may then write:

\[ v_L(y_L(n))\sum_{t=1}^{n} v_S(y_S^1(n)) = \sum_{t=1}^{n} v_S(C_L^{-1}(u^t(n))) \Delta u(n) \]

For large values of \( n \) we have

\[ \sum_{t=1}^{n} v_S(C_L^{-1}(u^t(n))) \Delta u(n) \approx \int_{u^1(n)}^{u^0(n)} v_S(C_L^{-1}(u))du = \int_{y_S^1(n)}^{y_S^0(n)} v_S(x) \frac{dC_L}{dx}(x)dx. \]
be $x^*$ since $\lim_{n \to \infty} C_S(y_L(n))v_L(y_L(n)) = \lim_{n \to \infty} C_S(y_L(n))\lim_{n \to \infty} v_L(y_L(n)) = C_S(0)0 = 0$.  

**Corollary 9** If there is a SME in $\Gamma_n^\infty$ for arbitrarily large values of $n$ it is necessary that:

$$v_S(x^*) + C_S(v_L^{-1}(0)) \leq 0$$

and if

$$v_S(x^*) + C_S(v_L^{-1}(0)) < 0$$

there is a SME for arbitrarily large values of $n$.

**Proof.** Consider the first part. Using (5), for all $n$ we have $v_S(y_L^{0}(n)) + C_S(y_L(n)) < 0$ so that at the limit we certainly have $v_S(x^*) + C_S(v_L^{-1}(0)) \leq 0$.

As for the second part the above theorem in fact proves that in the construction of theorem 6 for $n$ large enough $\hat{y}_L^1$ converges to $x^*$ as $\hat{y}_L$ goes to $v_L^{-1}(0)$; since $v_S(x^*) + C_S(v_L^{-1}(0)) < 0$ it must be that (5) will be satisfied and a SME is obtained.

5 Economic analysis of SME’s

Recall the main results. If $\Gamma_n^\infty$ has a SME it is unique. If both $\Gamma_n^\infty$ and $\Gamma_m^\infty$ have a SME with $m > n$ player $S$’s total rent is higher in $\Gamma_n^\infty$ than in $\Gamma_m^\infty$.

The application of condition (4) is straightforward. Player $S$ should select as the duration for his hit and run strategy the largest integer for which $\Gamma_n^\infty$ has a SME or any arbitrarily large integer if $\Gamma_n^\infty$ has a SME for arbitrarily large $n$.

Moreover if there is a SME in $\Gamma_n^\infty$ for arbitrarily large values of $n$ player $L$’s stage rent goes to zero as $n$ goes to infinity.

In the remaining part of this paper $n$ is selected according to condition (4). This defines the solution of the game $\Gamma^\infty$, the economic properties of which we want to now discuss.

We now come back to symmetric and asymmetric entry games. Recall that a symmetric game is such that $v_1 = v_2$ and $C_1 = C_2$ and that an asymmetric game may be derived from a symmetric one such that $v_1 = v_2 + \Delta f$, in which $\Delta f$ is a constant, and $C_1 = C_2$. If $\Delta f \geq 0$ player 1 is said to be strong and player 2 weak, and vice versa.

Consider first the issue of rent dissipation in symmetric games. Theorem 8 proves that if there is rent dissipation with SME in $\Gamma^\infty$, this solution is consistent with both HT and GPS: the relative time horizon for $S$ can be extended to infinity and the stage rent $v(y_L)$ goes to zero while the total rent $\Sigma_t v(y_L(t))$ goes to $C(v^{-1}(0))$. Yet, the major difference with SME lies in corollary 9: there may not always exist an equilibrium in $\Gamma^\infty$ for arbitrarily large values of $n$. With SME rent dissipation is no longer a generic property but need be studied case by case.

This result is contrary to the long tradition of industrial economics. The corresponding analysis of potential competition should be revisited: the issue
of short time commitment should decrease and more attention should be given
to other structural characteristics of the situation.

We proceed as follows. Firstly, a taxonomy of competitive situations is used
to interpret the results. Secondly, examples of entry games are introduced
to show that all cases in the typology may indeed be related to meaningful
economic situations.

5.1 A taxonomy of competitive situations and some pre-
liminary properties

Definition 10 A competitive situation is said to be one of :

under-competition : if \( L = \text{weak} \) and \( S = \text{strong} \) there exists \( n^* \) such that
\( \Gamma_n \) has no SME for all \( n > n^* \)
(a less efficient incumbent can deter entry forever and make stationary positive profits);

selection : if \( L = \text{weak} \) and \( S = \text{strong} \) there always exist SME’s for all \( n \) large enough
but if \( L = \text{strong} \) and \( S = \text{weak} \) there exists \( n^* \) such that \( \Gamma_n \) has no SME
for all \( n > n^* \)
(a less efficient incumbent is not able to deter entry forever and make sta-
tionary positive profits, but a more efficient incumbent may);

excess-competition : whether \( L = \text{weak} \) or \( L = \text{strong} \) there always exist SME’s for all \( n \) large enough
(if an incumbent were to choose to deter entry forever, it would have to
dissipate all of its profits ).

Only excess-competition occurs with HT. Only excess-competition or selec-
tion may occur with GPS. All three cases may occur with SME.

Under SME two simple results can be proved to relate a given competitive
situation to one of the three cases identified. Firstly consider the special case in which \( v \) and \( C \) are linear functions.

Proposition 11 If \( v \) and \( C \) are linear functions then rent dissipation prevails
if \( v_S(C_L^{-1}(0)) > C_S(v_L^{-1}(0)) \) while no rent dissipation prevails if \( v_S(C_L^{-1}(0)) < C_S(v_L^{-1}(0)) \).

Proof. The equation that defines \( x^* \) is 
\[ \int_{x^*}^{C_L^{-1}(0)} v(x) \frac{dC}{dx}(x) dx = 0. \]
Because of the linearity of the \( v \) and \( C \) functions, \( x^* \) is the symmetric of \( C_L^{-1}(0) \) with
respect to \( v_S^{-1}(0) \) so that \( v_S(x^*) = -v_S(C_L^{-1}(0)) \). Then the result follows from
corrolary 9. ■

This proposition is quite useful to classify situations in this special case.
Qualitatively speaking, it says that the entry cost should be high enough with
respect to the monopoly profit for rent dissipation to occur. This simple inter-
pretation may then be related to structural characteristics of the economic
situation at hand.

\(^{13}\)This taxonomy greatly benefited from the comments of an anonymous referee.
Secondly, a general comparative statics result always (not only in the linear case) holds. If there is excess-competition in a symmetric game then in the associated asymmetric game in which the long-term player is more and more efficient (increasing $\Delta f$), at some point his rent will become strictly positive. Conversely, if there is under-competition in a symmetric game then in the associated asymmetric game in which the long-term player is less and less efficient (decreasing $\Delta f$), at some point his rent will be fully dissipated. This means that the comparative statics of SME with respect to the relative efficiency of the two players goes in the expected direction contrarily to HT.

**Proposition 12** Take $v_L = v + \Delta f$, $v_S = v$ and $C_L = C_S = C$. Denote $H(\Delta f) = v_S(x^*) + C_S(v^{-1}_L(0))$ then:
- if $H(0) < 0$ there exists some $\Delta F > 0$ such that for all $\Delta f > \Delta F$ we have $H(\Delta f) > 0$;
- if $H(0) > 0$ then there exists some $\Delta F' < 0$ such that for all $\Delta f < \Delta F'$ we have $H(\Delta f) < 0$.

**Proof.** Consider the first statement, in $H(\Delta f) = v_S(x^*) + C_S(v^{-1}_L(0))$ observe that the first term does not depend on $\Delta f$ since $x^*$ is defined from the equation $\int_{v^{-1}_L(0)}^{x^*} v_S(x) \frac{dH}{dx}(x)dx = 0$ is independant of $\Delta f$. As for the second term we certainly have $v^{-1}_L(0)$ strictly decreasing in $\Delta f$ so that, since $C_S$ is a decreasing function and since we are assuming that its derivative is uniformly bounded away from zero this provides the result. Reversing the argument we obtain the second statement.

### 5.2 Economic models of potential competition

Two economic models of entry are analysed. In both models under-competition prevails when competition is tough in case of entry.

### 5.3 Competition through durable capital

Consider the profit and entry cost functions defined as follows:

$$v(x) = \pi^m x - f$$

$$C(x) = (\pi^m - \pi^d)(H - x)$$

Define symmetric and asymmetric games from these $v$ and $C$ functions.

This model may be interpreted as a reformulation\(^{14}\) of the Eaton and Lipsey model (1980). There firms compete through plants which become obsolete after $H$ units of time. The strategic decision for the incumbent consists in early replacement of its own plant. By doing so the incumbent prevent an entrant

---

\(^{14}\)See Gromb et al (1997) for details on this reformulation.
to preempt its market. Each time it sets a new plant, a firm incurs a fixed cost $f$. Operating costs are assumed to be zero. If both firms are in the market simultaneously, their duopoly flow of revenue is $\pi^d$ per unit of time. If only one is present, its flow of revenue is $\pi^m$. For consistency we certainly have $\pi^m > 2\pi^d$ and $\pi^m H \geq f$ so that $0 \leq \pi^{-1}(f) = f/\pi^m \leq H$. For simplicity also assume that $\pi^d H \leq f$. Note that $\Delta f$ may be interpreted as the difference in the fixed costs of the two firms.

In our framework a new stage game occurs each time a plant is set up, then $G(i)$ is such that:
- player $i$ is the incumbent, player $i$ may either select a move $x_i$ with $0 \leq x_i \leq H = C^{-1}(0)$, i.e. he sets at what time he will replace his plant, or if he will move out that is, he will decide not to set a new plant;
- if player $i$ selects $x_i$ then player $j$ may select in, i.e. player $j$ will preempt player $i$ by setting up his own plant exactly before the selected time $x_i$ (with respective payoffs for $i$ and $j$ : $v_i(x_i)$, $-C_j(x_i)$); indeed player $i$’s plant will have operated only for $x_i$ units of time while player $j$’s plant will be operating under a duopoly situation for the remaining life time of player $i$’s plant that is $H - x_i$ units of time; this entry cost is the opportunity cost that need be subtracted from player $j$’s next stage profit when he will be playing as the incumbent); or player $j$ may select out (with self explanatory payoffs $v_i(x_i), 0$);
- etc.

Beware that the plant life time goes with the moves within a stage game $G(i)$ while the discrete time in $\Gamma_{\infty}$ goes with the setting of new plants. Note that the exit payoff is $-d_i(x_i) = v_i(x_i)$ so that it is non positive for all $x_i$ since $\pi^d H \leq f$.

**Corollary 13** The game of competition through durable capital has a SME for arbitrary large values of $n$ (i.e. there is rent dissipation for the long-term incumbent):

for $L = \text{strong}$ and $S = \text{weak}$, iff $\Delta f < (H\pi^m - f)/\pi^d/(\pi^m - \pi^d)$;
for $L = \text{weak}$ and $S = \text{strong}$, iff $-(H\pi^m - f)\pi^d/\pi^m < \Delta f$.

**Proof.** Consider the first case that is, $v_L(x_L) = \pi^m x_L - f + \Delta f$ and $v_S(x_S) = \pi^m x_S - f$ and $C_1 = C_2 = C(x) = (\pi^m - \pi^d)(H - x)$.

Proposition 11 may be used. We have $v_L^{-1}(0) = (f - \Delta f)/\pi^m$ and $C^{-1}(0) = H$.

Then $-v_S(C^{-1}(0)) + C(v_L^{-1}(0)) = f - H\pi^m + (\pi^m - \pi^d)(H\pi^m - f)/\pi^m + \Delta f(\pi^m - \pi^d)/\pi^m = -\pi^d(H\pi^m - f)/\pi^m + \Delta f(\pi^m - \pi^d)/\pi^m$

which is indeed negative iff $\Delta f < (H\pi^m - f)\pi^d/(\pi^m - \pi^d)$.

The second case that is, $v_L = \pi^m x - f$ and $v_S = \pi^m x_i - f + \Delta f$ and $C$ unchanged, is obtained through similar calculations. ■

Fix $\pi^m$, $H$ and $f$ and let $\pi^d$ and $\Delta f$ vary. Depending on the values of $(\pi^d, \Delta f)$ the type of competition lies in different zones that may be depicted in a diagram (see figure 1). This illustrates the taxonomy. The corresponding zones are interpreted as follows:
- selection is obtained whatever \( \pi_d \) as long as \( \Delta f \) is large enough; observe that for \( \Delta f > H\pi^m - f \) the least efficient firm is barred from the market anyway (blockaded entry);
- excess-competition prevails for \( \pi_d > 0 \) and small enough \( \Delta f \);
- under-competition prevails for \( \pi_d < 0 \) and small enough \( \Delta f \).

Rent dissipation does not always prevail. The toughness of competition in the case of entry is the structural factor that matters: it directly determines the ratio of the entry cost relative to the monopoly profit. With a negative duopoly revenue the incumbent is able to secure a positive stage rent.

With GPS, selection always occurs as soon as \( \Delta f > 0 \). With SME it only occurs with \( \Delta f \) large enough (except at the singular point \( \pi^d = 0 \)).

These results seem to make economic sense.

### 5.4 Competition through short run price commitments

This form of competition is illustrative of the very notion of contestability (Bau-mol et al 1982). It has been formalized as an entry game in Ponssard (1991). Generally speaking, the stage game may be described as follows:
- firm \( i \) is the incumbent and sets a price \( p_i \);
- firm \( j \) decides to enter or not, if it does enter it sets a price \( p_j = p_i - \varepsilon \) in which \( \varepsilon \) is a strictly positive function which may depend on \( p_i \) according to the specific formulation of the entry game under study,\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\)Ordinarily the revenue function \( R(p) \) has a maximum (at the unconstrained monopoly price); we assume that \( \varepsilon \) is small enough so that \( C^{-1}(0) \) be less than this maximum so that \( \nu \) is indeed increasing on the relevant range of analysis. Still our construction may be extended if this were not the case.
- if firm \( j \) did not enter, firm \( i \) payoff is \( R(p_i) - f \) in which \( R \) is the monopoly revenue function with \( R'' > 0 \) and \( R''' < 0 \) and \( f \) a fixed cost incurred in case of production;
- if firm \( j \) did enter, firm \( j \) payoff is \( R(p_i - \varepsilon) - f \).

The symmetric entry game is thus defined with

\[
\begin{align*}
  v(p) &= R(p) - f \\
  C(p) &= -(R(p - \varepsilon) - f)
\end{align*}
\]

In this framework the notion of toughness of price competition can be captured by letting \( \varepsilon \) go to zero. In the symmetric case, with HT or GPS, such is a situation is as usual one of excess-competition: the incumbent price is forced to average cost i.e. to the price \( p_{ac} \) such that \( R(p_{ac}) - f = 0 \).

Ordinarily, such is not the case with SME: this situation is more typically one of under-competition. Consider the simple case of constant switching cost that is, \( \varepsilon = cst. \)

**Proposition 14** In an entry game with short run price commitments and constant switching costs, if this switching cost is close to zero, the situation is one of under-competition.

**Proof.** Since \( \varepsilon \) is close to zero we may use linear approximations of the \( v \) and \( C \) functions around the value \( p = p_{ac} \). Denote by \( p_L \) the value of \( p \) such that \( C(p_L) = 0 \). We certainly have \( p_L \) close to \( p_{ac} \). According to proposition 11 the ratio \( v(p_L)/C(p_{ac}) \) relative to 1 characterizes the situation. We may write

\[
\begin{align*}
  v(p_L)/C(p_{ac}) &= -(v(p_L) - v(p_{ac})/(p_L - p_{ac}))/(C(p_{ac}) - C(p_L))/((p_{ac} - p_L)) \quad \text{so that} \quad v(p_L)/C(p_{ac}) \text{ is close to } -v'(p_{ac})/C'(p_{ac}) = R'(p_{ac})/R''(p_{ac} - \varepsilon) < 1 \text{ since } R'' < 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Consider now the specific price model in Ponssard (1991), there \( \varepsilon \) is not constant. Still the situation remains one of under-competition. Yet, whenever \( \varepsilon \) is not close zero, we may have excess-competition. Again, how tough price competition is is the key factor.

Let \( \omega \) be a parameter to be interpreted as a price cross elasticity. The demand \( D_i \) to firm \( i \) is defined as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
  0 &\leq p_i < p_j -(1-p_j)/\omega & D_i(p_i, p_j) = D_i^{ac}(p_i) = 1 - p_i \\
  p_j -(1-p_j)/\omega &\leq p_i < p_j & D_i(p_i, p_j) = D_i^{ac}(p_i, p_j) = (1 + \omega)(1 - p_i + \omega(p_j - p_i))/(1 + 2\omega) \\
  p_i &\leq p_j + (1-p_j)/(1 + \omega) & D_i(p_i, p_j) = D_i^{ac}(p_i, p_j) = p_i \\
  p_j + (1-p_j)/(1 + \omega) &\leq p_i \\
\end{align*}
\]

The demand function is piece wise linear with a kink when the regime changes from a monopoly to a duopoly one. The higher \( \omega \) the smaller the duopoly range in which \( D_i = D_i^{ac} \) and the tougher the price competition (\( \varepsilon \) close to zero corresponds to large \( \omega \)).

Firm \( i \) incurs a stage fixed cost \( f \) if and only if it produces. There is no variable cost. Consequently player \( i \)'s profit as a function of the prices \( (p_i, p_j) \) writes:
if \( D_i(p_i, p_j) > 0 \)
\[ \pi_i(p_i, p_j) = D_i(p_i, p_j) \cdot p_i - f \]
if \( D_i(p_i, p_j) = 0 \)
\[ \pi_i(p_i, p_j) = 0 \]

The stage game \( G(i) \) is:
- player \( i \) is the incumbent, player \( i \) may either select a move \( p_i \) with \( 0 \leq p_i \leq 1 \), or move out i.e., he proposes no price;
- if player \( i \) selects \( p_i \) then player \( j \) may select in, in this case this means that he sets a price \( p_j \) which is his best response to \( p_i \) in terms of revenue that is, \textit{without taking account of his fixed cost}; denote \( p_j(p_i) \) this best response, then the players respective payoffs are \( (\pi_i(p_i, p_j), \pi_j(p_i, p_j)) \); or he may select out with respective payoffs \( (D_{m_i}(p_i), p_i - f, 0) \);
- etc.

The exit payoff which is \( d_i(p_i) = \pi_i(p_i, p_j(p_i)) \) is certainly non positive for all relevant \( p_i \).

Summing up the monopoly profit function \( v \) is such that:
\[ v(p) = D_{m}(p) \cdot p - f = (1 - p) p - f \]
and the entry cost \( C \) is defined as\(^{16} \)
\[ C(p) = -\max_{p_j} (D_j(p, p_j(p)) + f \]

Our attention will be limited to symmetric games. We want to investigate whether there is \textit{under} or \textit{excess-competition} depending on the two parameters \( \omega \) and \( f \). This depends on the sign of \( v(p^*) + C(v^{-1}(0)) \) in which \( p^* \) is defined by
\[ \int_{p^*}^{C^{-1}(0)} v(p) \frac{dC(p)}{dp} dp = 0 \]

Observe that the function \( C \) is not differentiable when the regime goes from the monopoly one to the duopoly one, but this is for only one point and has no bearing for the integral. Still we cannot obtain \( p^* \) from an analytical formula and a numerical analysis has to be made to characterize the competitive situation.\(^{17} \)

Figure 2 summarizes the results. In this table, \textit{UC} refers to \textit{under-competition}, \textit{EC} refers to \textit{excess-competition}.

The positions of \textit{UC} and \textit{EC} in the table clearly suggests a pattern. As stated, the situation is always one of \textit{under-competition} when \( w \) is large (i.e. \( \varepsilon \) close to zero). The higher \( f \) the lower \( w \) to obtain \textit{under-competition}. Such a context may be qualified as tough since the profit to be made is structurally low because of \( f \) and the price competition is high because of \( w \). On the opposite side the case of \textit{excess-competition} corresponds to simultaneous low values of \( f \) and \( w \), a context of less intense competition for the reverse reasons. This confirms the interpretation obtains with the previous example: structural factors related to the degree of toughness of competition do impact potential competition, the

\(^{16}\)This makes the calculation of \( C^{-1}(0) \) somewhat cumbersome.

\(^{17}\)The corresponding calculations may be obtained from the author upon request.
tougher the competition, the more likely it is that the incumbent may secure a positive rent.

6 Discussion

The major result of this paper is that under the SME approach, the celebrated rent dissipation result no longer holds systematically. In the analysis of the economics of potential competition the issue of short-term commitments no longer dominates the other economic characteristics of the game. Indeed, the tougher the competition in case of entry, the more likely rent dissipation does not hold.

Admittedly, these new results are obtained through a Markov equilibrium concept which may seem technically complex. But the underlying ideas, such as hit and run strategies, are intuitively simple and the results are derived under fairly general assumptions. Furthermore, this concept is directly in line with previous works which harbor clear drawbacks.

Still, to be more satisfactory the SME approach requires some further work. In this last section we point out some open questions.

Question 1: There may be other Markov equilibria which are consistent with the proposed definition of the state variable. Full characterization would be helpful. This has been obtained with the MT approach.

Question 2: In corollary 9 it is suspected that the condition \( v_S(x^*) + C_S(v_L^{-1}(0)) \leq 0 \) is not only necessary but also sufficient.

Question 3: For the proposed taxonomy, it should be true that in case of under-competition, when a weak player may remain with a strictly positive rent indefinitely, a strong player may also. This is more difficult than it may seem and does not follow from proposition 12.

Question 4:18 A more interesting issue concerns the fact that our assignment of player 1 and player 2 to the respective \( L \) or \( S \) positions may be considered as arbitrary. A more formal approach might be to have a preliminary stage at which

---

18This question greatly benefited from the comments of the anonymous referee who suggested the taxonomy.

---

Figure 2: The taxonomy for the price model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( f )</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>UC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>UC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( w )</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

each player decides how long he could stay, say $n_1$ for player 1 and $n_2$ for player 2. The choices $n_1$ and $n_2$ are then revealed and an infinitely repeated game $\Gamma_{n_1,n_2}^\infty$ is played in which each player can only use hit and run strategies according to the number of stages decided at the preliminary stage. Using a Markov formalization similar to the present one, it is suspected that the equivalent of theorem 7 holds (i.e., given $n_i$ the best response $n_j(n_i)$ is the highest $n_j$ for which the entry game $\Gamma_{n_1,n_2}^\infty$ has an equilibrium). If this were indeed the case, our taxonomy could be stated as follows:

- **selection**: only the strong player would select to stay infinitely (the limit equilibria in $\Gamma_{n_1,n_2}^\infty$ with respect to large values of $(n_1,n_2)$ would have $n_1^* = \infty$, $n_2^* < \infty$, where player 1 is the strong player); 
- **under-competition**: either player could select to stay infinitely but if one does, the other would not wish to, the preliminary game would be similar to a battle of the sexes game (there would be two limit equilibria $\Gamma_{n_1,n_2}^\infty$ with $n_1^* = \infty$, $n_2^* < \infty$ and $n_1^* < \infty$, $n_2^* = \infty$);
- **excess-competition**: either player would select to stay infinitely whatever the other one does, the preliminary game would be similar to a prisoner’s dilemma game (formally $\Gamma_{n_1,n_2}^\infty$ would have no limit equilibrium with respect to large values of $(n_1,n_2)$, the best response $n_1(n_2)$ being $\infty$ and vice versa, while both equilibrium payoffs in a game $\Gamma_{n_1,n_2}^\infty$ would decrease as $(n_1,n_2)$ increases).

Answers to these questions would provide a better understanding of the SME concept and make the MT concept appear as the limit of SME in case of excess-competition.

7 REFERENCES


