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Accueil du site > Séminaire Roy > 2012-2013

2012-2013

17 septembre 2012

Roland Strausz (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)
Benefits of Sequential Screening
Texte intégral

24 septembre 2012

Amil Dasgupta (LSE)
The Wall Street Walk when Blockholders Compete for Flows
Texte intégral

1er octobre 2012

Ludovic Renou (University of Essex)
Repeated Nash Implementation

8 octobre 2012

Roman Inderst
Tailored Advertising and Consumer Privacy

Texte intégral - Slide

22 octobre 2012

Konstantinos E. Zachariadis (LSE)
Optimality versus Practicality in Market Design : A Comparison of Two Double Auctions 1 - 2 [en] Full text 1 - 2

15 octobre 2012

Brian Rogers (Northwestern University)
Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
Texte intégral

12 novembre 2012

Heski Bar-Isaac (Stern School of Business, New York University)

19 novembre 2012

Joel Sobel (UCSD)
Effective Communication in Cheap Talk Games (with Navin Kartik)

26 novembre 2012

Daniel Krähmer (Bonn University)
Optimal Sequential Delegation
Texte intégral

3 décembre 2012

Felix Bierbrauer (University of Cologne)

17 décembre 2012

Tymofiy Mylovanov (University of Pennsylvania )

10 décembre 2012

Elchanan Ben Porath (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification (joint with Eddie Dekel and Bart Lipman)

14 janvier 2013

Patrick Legros (Université libre de Bruxelles)
Mismatch, Rematch and Investment

21 janvier2013

Botond Koszegi (Berkeley University, TBA)

28 janvier2013

Bard Harstad (Northwestern University)
The Market for Conservation and other Hostages

Abstract : This paper introduces the notion of "conservation goods" and shows how they differ fundamentally from traditional goods in dynamic settings. A conservation good (such as a tropical forest) is owned by a seller who is tempted to consume (or cut) it, but a buyer benefits more if the good is conserved. The buyer is unwilling to pay as long as the seller conserves, but the seller conserves only if the buyer is expected to buy. This contradiction implies that the market for conservation cannot be efficient, and conservation ends at a positive rate. Conservation is less likely if many buyers would benefit from it or if consumption has a low value. A rental market is similarly inefficient, and it dominates a sales market only if the value of conservation is low, the consumption value high, and if remote protection is costly. The theory explains why optimal conservation often fails and why conservation abroad is rented, while domestic conservation is bought

4 février 2013

Sujoy Mukerji (University of Oxford)
Relevance and Symmetry
Texte intégral

11 février 2013

Tore Ellingsen (Stockholm School of Economics)
Paying for Staying : Compensation Contracts and the Retention Motive
Coauteur : Eirik Gaard Kristiansen Texte intégral

18 mars 2013

Marco Ottaviani, Universita’Bocconi
Research and the Approval Process
Coauteur : Emeric Henry

et

Strategic Research Bias
Coauteur : Peter N. Sorensen

25 mars 2013

Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, BETA Université de Strasbourg
Household behavior and individual autonomy : An extended Lindahl mechanism
Co auteur : Claude d’Aspremont

8 avril 2013

Arno Riedl, University of Maastricht
Indecisiveness under Uncertainty : Incomplete Preferences in Disguise Texte intégral

15 avril 2013

Adam Szeidl, Berkeley & CEU Budapest
Treasure Hunt : Social Learning in the Field
Coauteur : Markus Mobius ; Tuan Phan
Résumé : We seed individuals in a real-world social network with information about quiz questions to experimentally measure the effectiveness of social learning. Using data on both the pre-existing social network and the actual conversation network, we find strong evidence that people learn from direct and indirect friends, but also that—unlike in standard models—information transmission is imperfect. We then compare two theories of social learning : a DeGroot-style model in which people double-count signals that reach them through multiple paths, and a “Streams” model in which people tag the source of information and hence do not double-count. In the conversation network, the weight a decision maker attaches to the signal of a person increases in the number of paths between them when the person is an indirect friend, but not when she is a direct friend. This fact is consistent with the Streams model in which multiple paths only increase the weight by increasing the transmission probability when—like with an indirect informer—transmission is imperfect. Structural and reduced-form estimates which exploit this and other variation generally support the Streams model combined with probabilistic transmission in our setting.

22 avril 2013

Amrita Dhillon, Warwick University
Status, Incentives and Corruption
Coauteur : Antonio Nicolo
Résumé : We re-examine the hypothesis that increasing compensation to public sector officials reduces corruption, defined as bribe-taking. We introduce heterogeneity among agents on the dimension of how much they are motivated by "status" or prestige of a profession vs. purely monetary compensation. We show that increasing wages in this setting may increase corruption under realistic conditions on parameters. Using "prestige" as a choice variable for policy may have reinforcing effects in reducing corruption : it reduces both bribe taking behavior as well as improves the selection of workers in the public sector. Media, on the other hand, by emphasizing the "bad news” about corruption may worsen corruption reducing the status of a profession. Finally, we show that in our setting the use of non-monetary bonus, like medals, may improve both the quality of the officials and their honesty.


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